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Defining Hypnosis:
Altered States and the Need for Parsimony
Wagstaff’s paper (this issue) argues that 
definitions of hypnosis should include the 
concept of an altered state in line with the 
original etymology of the term “hypnosis.” 
In this commentary, I focus on two limita-
tions of Wagstaff’s account: the ambiguity of 
the term altered state and problems defining 
hypnosis as increased suggestibility.  I argue 
that definitions of hypnosis need not refer to 
an altered state or increased suggestibility 
to be meaningful in the way that Wagstaff 
claims.
Defining Hypnosis as an 
Altered State
Wagstaff seems to offer two main argu-
ments for why a concept of an altered state 
is necessary for defining hypnosis.  In his 
first argument, Wagstaff claims that defini-
tions that focus only on the procedures of 
hypnosis (like the American Psychological 
Association definitions) are inadequate. 
According to Wagstaff, such definitions miss 
the essence of hypnosis, which is the effects 
that it produces, and lead to conceptual diffi-
culties by equating hypnosis and suggestion. 
Wagstaff asserts that these problems are 
avoided by accepting that hypnosis involves 
an altered state or trance.  In his second ar-
gument, Wagstaff identifies two opposing 
views of hypnosis — “the first more consistent 
with the idea of hypnosis as a trance, or al-
tered state, the second leaning more towards 
what is now known as the sociocognitive po-
sition on hypnosis, which tends to reject, or 
at least place less emphasis on, the concept 
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of a hypnotic altered state.  .  .” (p. 96) — and 
notes that both involve the concept of an al-
tered state.  Given empirical evidence that the 
hypnotic context — which Wagstaff considers 
to being akin to a suggestion itself — plays a 
role in suggestibility, Wagstaff summarises 
the two positions as either “an altered state 
that can exist independent of suggestion, or 
. . . the acceptance of a suggestion that one is 
in such a state” (p. 102).  Wagstaff concludes 
that both positions “use the idea of hypnosis 
as an altered state as a central or core concept 
in defining the concept of hypnosis” (p. 102, 
italics in original).
I suggest that both arguments are flawed. 
Regarding the first argument, I agree — as 
others have already pointed out (Nash, 
2005) — that a purely procedural definition 
of hypnosis is inadequate.  Nevertheless, it 
does not follow from this that one needs to 
accept the notion of an altered state or trance. 
One only needs to distinguish the procedure 
of hypnosis — the induction and sugges-
tions — from its products — the alterations in 
perception, memory, and action that it en-
tails — and include both aspects in the defi-
nition (Barnier & Nash, 2008; Nash, 2005). 
Hypnosis-as-product does not necessarily 
involve an altered state or trance — whether 
it does depends on how the ambiguous con-
structs of altered state and trance are defined, 
which is an issue that I will return to later. 
These constructs, however, are certainly not 
necessary to define hypnosis or to express the 
reality of hypnotic phenomena.  Indeed, even 
the distinction that Wagstaff draws between 
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hypnotic suggestibility (responsiveness to 
suggestions whilst in the hypnotic state) and 
hypnotic susceptibility (the ability to enter 
a hypnotic state) can be expressed without 
invoking the construct of state: that is, as 
responsiveness to suggestions and self-per-
ceived engagement in the overall hypnotic 
experience respectively.
Regarding the second argument, I dis-
agree with the proposal that it is necessary or 
desirable to use the term “altered state” sim-
ply because two supposedly opposing theo-
retical viewpoints can be expressed using 
this term.  Putting aside whether this dichot-
omy of theoretical viewpoints is meaningful, 
Wagstaff seems to use the term altered state 
in two different ways to characterise the two 
positions.  He observes, for example, that 
hypnosis is “either an altered state that exists 
independently of suggestion, or it involves 
acceptance of a suggestion for one.” (p. 102). 
These two viewpoints involve different con-
ceptions of an altered state in terms of what 
it actually is and the extent to which it can be 
differentiated from suggestion.  Contrary to 
Wagstaff’s view, the different ways in which 
the term “state” is used in these two accounts 
suggests the need for caution when using 
this term. 
Indeed, despite discussing definitions of 
hypnosis in great detail, Wagstaff does not 
offer a definition of what constitutes an al-
tered state.  When discussing limitations of 
his “generic trance hypothesis,” Wagstaff 
refers to definitions of altered states of con-
sciousness offered by Tart (in which a person 
feels as if their mental functioning is differ-
ent) and Farthing (in which a person believes 
that their mental functioning is different).  It 
is not clear if Wagstaff accepts these defini-
tions in the context of hypnosis.  However, 
both definitions — at least as quoted by 
Wagstaff — define an altered state entirely in 
terms of the subject’s own self-report, which 
may overlook other aspects of hypnosis, such 
as the interpersonal interaction involved and 
the behavioural responses that it can pro-
duce.  Although the implication seems to 
be that hypnosis involves experiences and 
behaviours that are not usually present in 
everyday life, the precise definition of the 
construct of altered state is not clearly de-
fined.  This is problematic because it is a term 
that can be interpreted in different ways.
As others have already noted, defining 
an altered state can be difficult and prone to 
misinterpretation (Cardeña, 2011; Hilgard, 
1980; Kihlstrom, 2005, 2007, 2008).  It can 
be unclear, for example, whether the term 
altered state is intended to be merely de-
scriptive (indicating that some alteration in 
consciousness is present) or whether it is in-
tended to offer explanatory power (indicat-
ing that it plays some role in causing an al-
teration in consciousness; see Hilgard, 1969; 
Kileen & Nash, 2004; Nash, 2005).  In a simi-
lar way, there is the related danger of reifying 
an altered state as an entity separate from the 
organism that experiences it (Bunge, 1980). 
It can also be unclear the extent to which an 
altered state is a uniform and unchanging 
entity — as the term implies — and the extent 
to which an altered state remains discrete 
from other states (Cardeña, 2011; Hilgard, 
1969; Kihlstrom, 2008).  Given these ambi-
guities and the potential for misinterpreta-
tion, it may be prudent to avoid using the 
term “altered state” in a definition of hypno-
sis unless this term is also clearly defined.  
Distinguishing Hypnosis 
from Other Altered States
Wagstaff’s definition of hypnosis also in-
volves the notion of increased suggestibility. 
Wagstaff notes that hypnosis shares many 
characteristics with everyday experiences 
(e.g., day dreaming) and other altered states 
(e.g., meditation) in terms of subjective feel-
ings of relaxation and their effects on atten-
tion.  According to Wagstaff, however, these 
other experiences and states do not neces-
sarily involve an increase in suggestibil-
ity in the same way as hypnosis.  Wagstaff 
observes that what distinguishes hypnosis 
from these other experiences and states is 
a hypnotic context — a label that the experi-
ence is hypnotic.  Wagstaff notes evidence 
that increased suggestibility can occur after 
relaxation or meditation — or even in condi-
tions of alertness and physiological arous-
al — so long as it is referred to as hypnotic. 
According to Wagstaff, this labelling of the 
context as hypnotic is akin to a separate 
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“suggestion to the hypnotic subject that he or 
she is entering an altered state of conscious-
ness we call ‘hypnosis’”(p. 99) and this “sug-
gestion for hypnosis” (p. 99) is necessary to 
produce the increased suggestibility that is a 
defining feature of hypnosis.
Both increased suggestibility and a hyp-
notic context, however, are not critical to 
hypnosis.  As Wagstaff acknowledges, in-
creased suggestibility is not always present 
after a hypnotic induction.  Indeed, partici-
pants can experience alterations in percep-
tion, memory, and action without a hypnotic 
induction and outside of an explicit hypnotic 
context (Hilgard, 1965).  In addition, all these 
alterations can be produced by posthypnotic 
suggestion — that is, a suggestion to experi-
ence a hypnotic effect after hypnosis has 
been formally terminated when a particu-
lar cue is presented.  It is not immediately 
clear how posthypnotic suggestion can be 
reconciled with Wagstaff’s view of the hyp-
notic context as a suggestion itself (does a 
posthypnotic suggestion imply a second sug-
gestion to re-enter a hypnotic state?).  In any 
case, these counter-examples indicate that 
both increased suggestibility and a hypnotic 
context are not necessary for a definition of 
hypnosis.  
Defining Hypnosis
Rather than increased suggestibility or 
a hypnotic context, hypnosis is perhaps 
better characterised by the alterations in 
perception, memory, and action that it can 
produce.  Somewhat surprisingly, Wagstaff 
does not refer to Kihlstrom’s (1985, pp. 385–
386) canonical definition of hypnosis:
Hypnosis is a process in which one per-
son, designated the hypnotist, offers sug-
gestions to another person, designated 
the subject, for imaginative experiences 
entailing alterations in perception, mem-
ory and action.  In the classic case, these 
experiences are associated with a degree 
of subjective conviction bordering on de-
lusion, and an experienced involuntari-
ness bordering on compulsion.  As such, 
the phenomena of hypnosis reflect altera-
tions in consciousness that take place in 
the context of a social interaction.  
Such a definition does not suffer from 
the problems that Wagstaff identifies with 
other definitions of hypnosis.  It also does 
not suffer from the problems that I suggest 
are in Wagstaff’s own account.
Wagstaff notes that the term “hypnosis” 
was originally derived from a Greek word 
for sleep, and came to be associated with the 
idea of an altered state.  In the same way that 
hypnosis is no longer defined in terms of 
sleep, hypnosis need not be defined in terms 
of an altered state.  Rather than attempting 
to accommodate the etymological origins of 
the term as Wagstaff proposes, it is more im-
portant to ensure that a definition is parsi-
monious and not open to misinterpretation.
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